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Abstract 
In this paper I argue that the politicization of civil society can lead non-state actors to 
create new international institutions which compete with traditional intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) to provide global public goods; this competition over resources 
and authority, in turn, can put IGOs under pressure to undertake institutional change. I 
illustrate this argument by looking at the changing role of the World Health Organiza-
tion in the field of global health. The case study shows how increased funding to 
support health initiatives in other UN agencies, the burgeoning of health NGOs, and 
the emergence of private foundations such as the Gates Foundation, put the WHO 
under pressure to change in order to avoid becoming irrelevant. 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die WHO sagt: Wettbewerb ist gesund. Wie Zivilgesellschaft IGOs verändern kann. 
Das Papier argumentiert, dass aufgrund der Legitimitätskrise intergouvernementaler 
Organisationen zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure selbst neue Institutionen gründen, um 
die anstehenden governance-Aufgaben anstelle der IGOs zu übernehmen. Diese neuen 
Institutionen können daher als Rivalen verstanden werden, die in Konkurrenz zu den 
traditionellen IGOs nach knappen Ressourcen wie Finanzen und Autorität streben. 
Diese Konkurrenz setzt IGOs zunehmend unter Druck, sich institutionell zu wandeln. 
Das vorliegende Papier illustriert dieses Argument anhand der Reform der Weltge-
sundheitsorganisation (WHO). Die Fallstudie zeigt, wie die zunehmende Bereitstel-
lung von Mitteln für Gesundheitsinitiativen in anderen UN Organisationen, die stei-
gende Zahl von Gesundheits-NGOs und die Entstehung von privaten Stiftungen wie 
der Gates Foundation, die WHO unter Druck setzte sich zu wandeln, um in diesem 
neuen Handlungsumfeld ein relevanter Akteur zu bleiben. 
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1. The Politicization Thesis and the Question of Institutional Change 
International institutions are expanding their mandates to include more “behind the 
border issues” and this in turn means that societal actors, not just governments, are 
increasingly the target of international governance. According to a recent article 
entitled “The Unintended Formation of Political Order Beyond the Nation State,” this 
increased interventionism has not gone unnoticed—or uncriticized—by civil society 
(see Zürn, Binder, Ecker-Ehrhardt, and Radtke 2007). On the one hand, the more 
prominent role of international institutions has led civil society actors to make increas-
ing governance demands of them. On the other hand, as these increased demands are 
disappointed, they trigger political opposition based on the legitimacy deficit of such 
institutions. Thus politicization, according to Zürn et al. (2007), is the process of 
society’s increased sensitization to questions of institutional power and legitimacy at 
the international level. 
More specifically, Zürn et al. (2007) lays out a multi-step argument about the poli-
ticization of international governance. The first step in this process is the growing 
perception that international institutions are increasingly relevant to issues of global 
governance, which in turn changes expectations of societal actors. This leads more or 
less organized networks of social actors to make increasing demands on governance 
beyond the nation state. But as these increased expectations are inevitably disap-
pointed, criticism of and opposition to decision-making procedures and policies 
increase. Disappointment is manifested as political opposition “whose outward forms 
can range from a lack of compliance and critical public focus to violent protests” 
(Zürn et al. 2007, 19). These disappointments reinforce normative demands for the 
democratic legitimation of these institutions. Demands are made for increased trans-
parency, accountability, and representativity. 
According to this argument, in the face of politicization, the “only option that may 
remain open is the path of renewed institutional adaptation” (Zürn et al. 2007, 19). 
One implication, then, of the politicization thesis is that it can lead to institutional 
change. This paper picks up on this insight and attempts to build on the politicization 
thesis by teasing out the mechanisms by which politicization can lead to institutional 
change. Thus the first step of this paper is to ask: By what mechanisms can this loss of 
Lora Anne Viola y WHO Says Competition Is Healthy 2
 
 
legitimacy and the consequent politicization of an international institution lead to 
institutional change?  
Drawing on social closure theory, I identify two strategies of change that are 
already implied by the Zürn et al. thesis: conformity and protest. A conformist strategy 
is what we might call an “insider” strategy, by which civil society groups attempt to 
enter an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and change it from within. A protest 
strategy, in contrast, is an “outsider” strategy in that it is a rejection of the status quo 
and it attempts to change IGOs by bypassing them rather than reforming them. In 
addition to these two strategies, I argue that there is a third possibility which has 
received relatively less attention in this context: competition. My thesis is that intro-
ducing actors that compete with IGOs—either for authority or for resources—can 
create pressures that force an institution to undertake change. Although in reality these 
three strategies are not always neatly separable, and indeed they might sometimes 
work best in combination, it is worth teasing them apart analytically in order to better 
investigate how they operate. In this spirit, the next step of my analysis is to focus on 
competition as a mechanism of institutional change in the context of politicization.  
I illustrate my argument through an analysis of the politicization of the World 
Health Organization (WHO). In its first several decades of existence, the WHO was 
the leading authority among just a few international health organizations. It lived in a 
sparsely populated institutional environment, was well-funded, and had a technical 
mandate that shielded it from political engagement and interventionist activities. But 
over the 1970s and 1980s, the area of global health changed from being an issue 
dominated by a technical, non-political discourse to an issue tightly connected in the 
public discourse to the political questions of development and human rights. In light of 
this change, the WHO came under increasing scrutiny and critique from national aid 
agencies, from health activists and NGOs, and in large part from the broader health 
epistemic community. By the end of the 1990s the WHO was suffering from a crisis of 
legitimacy as a result of almost ten years of not living up to the new expectation that it 
would be a leader on global health beyond its technical mandate. This crisis opened 
the door for competitors to flood the global health issue area, challenging the WHO’s 
authority and funding base. Heightened competitive pressures forced the WHO to 
undertake institutional changes in order to recover its role as a leader on global health. 
Lora Anne Viola y WHO Says Competition Is Healthy 3
 
 
2. Mechanisms of Institutional Change 
Research has thus far shown that there are a number of ways in which institutional 
change can occur. Institutional change can evolve gradually and organically over time 
(Thelen 2004; Hannan and Freeman 1989), it can occur from the top-down through 
rational design (Koremenos et al. 2001), or it can combine evolution and design (Viola 
and Snidal 2007). Institutional change can be driven by the goals of the principals, 
halted by entrenched bureaucratic cultures, or prompted by the need to find technical 
solutions to the political problems of coordination. But in the context of the politici-
zation thesis, what is of interest to me here is to investigate a particular source of 
institutional change—change prompted by a politicized civil society. In my case, for 
example, I am interested in how the WHO changed as a reaction to politicization. I am 
not arguing that politicization necessarily leads to institutional change. And although it 
would be an interesting avenue of future research, I do not consider here the 
circumstances under which politicization is more or less likely to lead to change. 
Rather, I am interested in considering the mechanisms by which it could lead to 
institutional change. 
International organizations are often set up to provide the international community 
with public goods. From this point of view, a legitimacy crisis can come from doing 
either too much (raising sovereignty concerns) or from doing too little (not delivering 
on the promised public goods).1 In any case, opposition is likely to come from a sense 
of damage to the public good. But dissatisfaction with global governance is likely to 
arise not just when international institutions fall short of heightened expectations, but 
when these institutions remain closed to social actors. Indeed, the notion of social 
closure, I propose, can be fruitfully employed when investigating international institu-
tions.  
Thinking about International Organizations in Terms of Closure 
Weber introduced the term “social closure” to refer to the process whereby one group 
of actors excludes others from participating in its privileges (Weber 1978, 43-46 and 
                                                 
1 While Zürn et al. (2007) focus on the former, the WHO case highlights the importance of the lat-
ter for politicization. 
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926-955; see also Parkin 1974; Collins 1979; Murphy 1988). In the case of interna-
tional institutions, these privileges refer specifically to the powers of decision making, 
regulation, and resource distribution. Groups achieve closure by selectively excluding 
and including through specific conventions, rules, and practices. These can be what I 
would call allocative techniques which allow only select actors to participate in the 
group, or obfuscationist techniques which decrease the transparency of the group to 
outsiders.2 Most international organizations are intergovernmental and use sovereignty 
as the key criterion of membership. Through this criterion, non-state actors are auto-
matically excluded. Sometimes states are excluded too—as exemplified by the UN 
Security Council. The extent and nature of closure depends on the institutional rules 
that shape the body.  
Closure has implications for distributive justice when those actors excluded 
from participating are nevertheless affected by the decisions made. Because of this, 
social closure theorists argue that closure has the potential to provoke a reaction on the 
part of excluded actors. Excluded actors may try to exercise power in an upward 
direction in order to open up the closed group (Murphy 1988, 10). In this light, politi-
cization can be conceptualized as a struggle to gain access to a closed sphere, to 
recapture power over decisions and policies. This struggle for openness can manifest 
itself, as Zürn et al. (2007) argue, in a demand for transparency, accountability, and 
representativity. Closure theory articulates two basic strategies for opening up closed 
clubs: the conformist and the protest strategies. The conformist strategy is an insider 
strategy, while the protest strategy is an outsider strategy. The conformist strategy is to 
gain entry to a group and use that access to change it from within by becoming part of 
the policy process. The protest strategy is to exert pressure from the outside through 
mechanisms like shaming, boycotting, and public exposure of bad policies. In addition 
                                                 
2 Modern academic status offers examples of both. Belonging to academia is based on having cer-
tain credentials such as graduate school degrees, which represent an allocative technique. But group 
closure is also maintained through professional jargon, which represents an obfuscationist technique. 
These techniques need not imply a negative intentionality, but they nevertheless have distributional 
consequences vis-à-vis insiders and outsiders. See Collins (1979) for more on education as a form of 
social closure. 
Lora Anne Viola y WHO Says Competition Is Healthy 5
 
 
to these, I suggest that there is a third option—competition—missing from this tradi-
tional list.3  
Conform 
Conformist strategies, or what we might call “insider” strategies, involve making 
oneself appealing to the membership insiders.4 Actors who use this strategy try to gain 
entrance by assimilating as closely as possible to the dominant political principles of 
the system. As the dominant attributes and norms change, then we should expect the 
conformist strategy to change accordingly. These actors seek equal opportunity with 
insiders, but they do not dispute the basic logic of the system. The idea is that by 
embracing the relevant institutions, change can be enacted from within. This strategy 
has a high potential for success since it offers access to the closed group’s policy 
makers and the policy process. For this reason, Risse-Kappen says that “‘clever’ 
transnational actors adapt” to the existing structures to achieve their goals (1995, 26). 
Many institutions now have formalized avenues for civil society participation. 
ECOSOC is the principal body responsible for channeling non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO) input into the UN and its subsidiary bodies. ECOSOC maintains a set of 
rules and criteria that govern the interaction between NGOs and IGOs. Through 
ECOSOC NGOs can gain consultative status at the UN, which allows them to attend 
meetings, make written and oral statements, and place items on the agenda at 
ECOSOC and other UN bodies. Civil society groups thus become “rationalized” in the 
sense that they get clear rules and they get assigned a formal status. These rules 
effectively turn international groups into interest groups that are allowed to lobby the 
organization in question. Although this strategy can be successful, actors who adopt 
the conformist strategy also run the risk of co-optation. This can in part explain why 
alternative strategies might be chosen. 
Protest 
The protest strategy, or what Murphy calls “revolutionary usurpation,” is the direct 
attempt to change the structure of the group or society (Murphy 1988, 77). It is an 
                                                 
3 It would certainly be a promising avenue of research to think about when which strategy is pur-
sued and which combinations might be most successful, but I do not do that in this paper. 
4 In Murphy’s terminology this would be called “inclusionary usurpation” (1988, 77). 
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“outsider” strategy in that it implies a rejection of the status quo and a demand not just 
for different outcomes but for different standards of distributive justice. This strategy 
is revisionist. Although conformism may be more successful at gaining access, protest 
often arises out of the suspicion that conformist strategies lead to co-optation, thus the 
protest strategy often focuses on cracking open the closed group by undermining it. 
Usurpation constitutes a threat to the current stratification between insiders and 
outsiders which can range from the demand for alternative models of global govern-
ance or a complete overhaul of the dominant system. Consequently, usurpationists 
sometimes call for violence. 
Protest, or usurpationist, strategies include those seen against the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at Seattle in 1999 or against the G-8 Summits in Genoa in 2001 
and Heiligendamm in 2007. NGOs such as ATTAC, dissent!, Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth, and People’s Global Action against the World Trade Organization (PGA) 
use protest strategies to resist international organizations. Greenpeace, for example, 
has expressed less interest in reforming the WTO than in bypassing it altogether, as 
the title of a recent briefing paper asks “Is the WTO the only way?”5 It sees the WTO 
as “fatally flawed” and as “moving the world in the wrong direction—away from 
peace, security and sustainability. By stalling on issues that are crucial to poorer 
countries, the WTO faces a crisis of legitimacy.”6 The PGA, to take another example, 
is based on direct action and civil disobedience and has recently decided to take the 
word “non-violent” out of its description. In its self-description the group claims “a 
confrontational attitude, since we do not think that lobbying can have a major impact 
in such biased and undemocratic organisations, in which transnational capital is the 
only real policy-maker.”7 
Competition 
In addition to the conform and protest strategies, activists reacting to the low legiti-
macy of international institutions can also adopt the “do it yourself” strategy. Instead 
of working through an institution or protesting the use of that institution, actors can 
                                                 
5 <http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2005/alternatives_wto.pdf> accessed 20 Nov. 2008. 
6 <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/trade-and-the-environment>, accessed 20 
Nov. 2008. 
7 <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/gender/desire/nutshell.htm>, accessed 20 Nov. 2008. 
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form institutions which aim to carry out the same functions as the IGO. These institu-
tions may become rivals of an IGO to the extent that they successfully compete for 
resources. Specifically, for all types of international institutions the relevant resources 
are authority and funding. Competition over resources can, in turn, lead to pressures 
for adaptation. Competitive pressures are ultimately a function of the availability of 
resources in the environment. When resources are scarce, competitive pressures 
increase, and the pressure to adapt will be high. When resources are plentiful, then 
competition will be lower, and the pressure to adapt will also be lower. Competitive-
ness, or fitness, is a result of an institution’s relationship to its resource environment. 
When exogenous changes occur in the environment, an institution can choose to do 
nothing and risk becoming irrelevant, or it can adapt by making internal changes. 
There are good reasons to think that competitive pressures among international 
institutions are generally not high.8 First, relative to the domestic environment, the 
international institutional environment is sparsely populated. The existence of many 
institutions would increase the relative scarcity of resources, making competition 
tougher and increasing the pressure to adapt. Second, many institutions do not com-
pete over the same resources, further attenuating adaptive pressures. We would expect, 
then, that international institutions have relatively low pressures to adapt which, in 
turn, allows the persistence of institutions at low levels of efficiency or legitimacy. 
There are, however, some important exceptions. International trade institutions, for 
example, face a proliferation of regional arrangements which has arguably led to 
greater competition among institutions driven by “forum shopping” by states. More 
relevant to my discussion here is that some issue areas are also being flooded with 
civil society actors with important resources—whether these be financial or authority 
based—which can change the landscape in which IGOs operate. Competitive 
pressures can be increased intentionally in order to force change. But an unintentional 
increase in competitive pressures can also lead to change. 
In the following section I use the case of the WHO to illustrate how politicization can 
lead to competition and how this, in turn, can lead to institutional change. 
                                                 
8 Realists however often claim that the international environment is highly competitive among 
states. But the low rate of state death calls this into question. 
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3. The WHO Says Competition Is Healthy 
The WHO has undergone a change in the last twenty years that is illustrative of the 
politicization dynamic outlined earlier. In large part through the WHO’s own activism, 
the perception of global health issues has shifted away from an insular technical issue 
to a multisectoral political issue. With this changed perception came an expanding 
mandate and rising expectations of what the WHO ought to achieve. But the organiza-
tional structure of the WHO was not equipped to successfully carry out these new 
demands. In the face of failures on the health front, various actors began to publicly 
criticize the management and vision of the WHO. The legitimacy of the WHO was 
called into question by national aid agencies, such as the Danish DANIDA, by health 
activists and NGOs, and in large part by the broader health epistemic community. 
Criticisms were levied against the leadership, organizational structure, and finances of 
the WHO. These critiques can be clearly seen in the journals that are the forum of the 
epistemic community. The WHO did not respond to these demands and the crisis 
escalated until the consensus in the public sphere was that the WHO had suffered a 
massive loss of confidence and legitimacy. WHO donors began diverting their invest-
ments elsewhere and health professionals began setting up alternative programs. As 
part of a general burgeoning of NGOs, new actors began to emerge as health-related 
authorities. In this environment resources became scarce and the WHO was forced to 
compete with other new actors for the limited financial resources available. If it 
wanted to recover its authority and funding, the WHO needed to change. These 
developments can be summarized as: (1) expanding mandate and rising expectations, 
(2) loss of legitimacy and politicization, and (3) competition and institutional change. 
3.1 Expanding Mandate and Rising Expectations 
Traditional Role of the WHO 
The WHO Constitution, which entered into force in 1948, lays out a mandate that 
fulfills traditional institutional roles. The institution was charged primarily with 
facilitating government coordination, furnishing technical assistance, setting standards, 
and collecting and distributing information (WHO Constitution, Chapter II, Article 2). 
In its first decades, the WHO interpreted this mandate cautiously. Staffed almost 
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exclusively with (male) medical doctors, it offered technical advice; set normative 
standards on issues such as sanitation, food products, nomenclature, and teaching and 
training; and engaged in research and information gathering from its headquarters in 
Geneva. Through its focus on technocratic matters, the WHO avoided explicitly 
political questions. In 1952, for example, the WHO decided not to undertake a popula-
tion program because of the religious and political implications it might have (Godlee 
1994b). Meanwhile, in the same year John D. Rockefeller and a group of scientists 
agreed to form the Population Council, a non-governmental organization to guide 
governments on questions of demographic change because “the world was awakening 
to the rapid growth in population that was occurring around the globe.”9 While the 
WHO shied away, the Population Council (with the backing of a wealthy philanthro-
pist) became an authority on population changes. 
The WHO attempted to maintain its technocratic attitude even after the accession 
of a large number of newly decolonized states in the 1960s, but by the 1970s, in the 
face of faltering Third World programs and increasingly global and transnational 
problems, the WHO began to rethink its role. In particular, the WHO’s malaria eradi-
cation program was failing and it realized that, in order to really combat malaria and 
other diseases in the Third World, it needed to address underlying problems of basic 
health infrastructure. These underlying problems, however, could no longer be defined 
as simply technical; they were problems with social, economic, and political ramifica-
tions. The shift away from a technological view of health to a broader focus on the 
socioeconomic causes of health problems began with WHO Director-General Dr. 
Halfdan Mahler who took office in 1973. Mahler argued that in order to address 
health, it is crucial to address other social issues such as working conditions, family 
life, community infrastructure, education, and agriculture. This new vision was based 
on the idea that the WHO should be an advocate of social justice between developing 
and developed worlds (Godlee 1994a; Cueto 2004). The World Health Assembly 
(WHA), for example, “endorsed expert reports on the dangers of nuclear weapons and 
the epidemiological effects of the Vietnam War” (Cortell and Peterson 2006, 266). It 
also took a stand on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, arguing that the health of Pales-
                                                 
9 <http://www.popcouncil.org/about/history.html>, accessed 20 Nov. 2008. 
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tinians was being compromised by Israeli policies. Mahler’s approach was more 
interventionist and more political than the WHO had ever been. 
New Role for the WHO 
This new approach was expressed more systematically in 1977 when Mahler began an 
ambitious new initiative under the slogan “health for all by the year 2000.” The idea 
was that all individuals in the world should have “a level of health that will permit 
them to lead a socially and economically productive life” (WHO, Declaration of 
Alma-Ata: V). In 1978 the WHO issued the Declaration of Alma-Ata which placed 
emphasis on the development of primary health care as a strategy for reaching the 
“health for all” goal. This declaration made explicit connections between health and 
social, economic, and political development. “Primary health care reflects and evolves 
from the economic conditions and sociocultural and political characteristics of the 
country and its communities” (Op. cit.: VII, 1). The declaration also expanded the 
potential role for the WHO by maintaining that health care “involves, in addition to 
the health sector, all related sectors and aspects of national and community develop-
ment, in particular agriculture, animal husbandry, food, industry, education, housing, 
public works, communications and other sectors; and demands the coordinated efforts 
of all those sectors” (Op cit.: VII, 4). The declaration defined primary health care 
broadly to include education, promotion of food supply and proper nutrition, safe 
water and sanitation, maternal and child health care including family planning, immu-
nization, prevention and treatment of diseases, and provision of essential drugs (Op. 
cit.: VII, 3). The initiative also signaled a willingness to engage in a more interven-
tionist role by “providing promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative services” 
(Op. cit.: VII, 2).  
This new approach became most visible when in 1987 the WHO started the first 
global program on AIDS under the direction of Dr. Jonathan Mann. Over the course of 
the next few years this would grow to the biggest WHO program and one of the most 
important world-wide with a 100 million dollar a year budget. Mann began by bring-
ing a group of researchers to Zaire to collect information about the disease and over 
the next few years established AIDS programs in over 100 countries. The AIDS 
program transformed the way the world discussed matters of health. Mann structured 
health as a human rights issue, not just a medical issue. He developed a four-step 
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multidisciplinary approach for evaluating the overlapping and interdependent aspects 
of health and human rights. Mann’s approach to AIDS is “now considered axiomatic” 
(Leaning 1998, 754). At a time when the focus was on cleaning the blood supply, the 
WHO was arguing that prevention is essential and that the key to prevention is under-
standing the social and behavioral dynamics of transmission. 
Mahler was described by the health community as a charismatic visionary who 
worked hard to bring a new perspective on health into the international consciousness. 
In doing so he clearly expanded the WHO’s mission. This expansion was part of a 
realization occurring more broadly across international institutions that interdepend-
ence is increasing the transnational nature of problems. Nothing exemplified this trend 
better than the alarming spread of AIDS across the world. When he left office in 1988 
the New York Times approvingly reported that “During Dr. Mahler’s three five-year 
terms as Director General, the health organization oversaw the eradication of small-
pox. It raised the rate of child inoculation from 5 percent of the world’s children to 50 
percent, and it recently began to coordinate global programs against acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome” (Lewis 1988). Nevertheless, this change of direction was at 
odds with the organizational structure and traditional mandate of the WHO. 
3.2 Loss of Legitimacy and Politicization 
As the WHO mandate was expanding, expectations—arguably unrealistic expecta-
tions—about what the WHO could achieve were also rising. The goal of “health for all 
by 2000” was illusory and even those who worked at the WHO at the time admit that 
it was unrealistic to think that such a vague and broad goal could be attained (Godlee 
1994b). The prominence of the WHO had increased but the problems, like AIDS, 
became even more challenging. At the same time, the organizational capacity of the 
WHO went unchanged to meet these new challenges. The tension between the new 
vision and the old structure could only be successfully resolved by returning to the old 
mandate or by renewing the structure to reflect the new mission. Under Mahler’s 
successor, Nakajima, the WHO would first try the former path. But a new health 
activism that developed in part out of Mahler’s work made this path highly unpopular. 
The newly politicized issue of global health could not be erased from public awareness 
and simply returned to the technical backroom. The WHO was increasingly criticized 
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at the organizational, leadership, and financial level for not implementing a more 
activist agenda. As I discuss in section 3.3, the WHO was punished for its lack of 
activism until it was forced to “adapt or die.” 
Organizational Challenges  
The WHO is comprised of four main bodies: the Director General’s Office, the Execu-
tive Board, the World Health Assembly, and the Regional Offices. The World Health 
Assembly (WHA) is officially the decision making body of the WHO and is com-
prised of delegates from all the UN member states. It meets in Geneva once a year to 
determine policies, supervise and approve the program budgets, and to instruct the 
Executive Board about matters for further action. In practice, the WHO is run by the 
Executive Board which is currently composed of 34 members technically qualified in 
the field of health.10 The Executive Board creates the agenda and resolutions to be 
considered by the Health Assembly. The Executive Board also nominates the Director-
General. Although the Executive Board’s nominee is subject to WHA approval, in 
practice the WHA always follows the recommendation of the Executive Board. In 
addition to headquarters in Geneva, there are six regional offices each run by a Re-
gional Director. This structure, which combines a strong Director-General and Execu-
tive Board with a relatively weak assembly, might be appropriate for a low-profile 
technical agency, but became increasingly problematic when the WHO took on a more 
political role. 
In general the WHO staff at all levels operates with little oversight from member 
states—an indication that at its creation the organization was not thought of as being a 
political actor. Although some decisions, such as amendments to the constitution, 
require a two-thirds majority vote by the WHA, most decisions require only a majority 
vote in the WHA (WHO Constitution 1948: Art. 60). For the most part, however, 
power is concentrated in the Executive Board (including the Director-General) whose 
members are voted on by the WHA. The Executive Board has no permanent members, 
every member has one equal vote, and there are usually not more than two developed 
states on the board at a time. This structure makes it difficult for powerful member 
                                                 
10 This number has changed over time and at the time of the WHO crisis in the 1990s there were 
31 members of the Executive Board. 
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states to have a strong influence over the organization. But this is consistent with the 
intent of the institution; WHO leaders were thought of as being professionals and 
experts rather than representatives of political bodies. According to WHO doctrine, 
“members of the board serve as individuals, not as national representatives” (Cortell 
and Peterson 2006, 265). 
In the running of the organization, the Director-General has wide discretionary 
power. The core work of the WHO, including reports that are drafted and research that 
is conducted, requires only the approval of the Director-General, not the WHA 
(Cortell and Peterson 2006, 265; Jacobson 1973). This, in combination with control 
over the budget, gives the Director-General power in setting the agenda for the organ-
ization. Moreover, the process of selecting the Director-General is non-transparent and 
largely left to the Executive Board. After Director-General Nakajima was successfully 
voted into office for a second term despite his widespread unpopularity among 
member states (especially powerful member states) and within the health community, 
the electoral process was heavily criticized. There had been no formal advertising of 
the post, no public debate, no open discussion of candidates’ policy platforms. 
Jonathan Mann, speaking after he left the WHO remarked that “Thirty-one people 
have made what is probably the most important decision in global health with no 
public scrutiny” (Brown and Patel 1993). He, among other observers in the health 
community, argued that the system should be reformed to make it more open to public 
scrutiny (Peabody 1995). Of course, the idea of opening the election of the Director-
General to public scrutiny and to having candidates formally propose their policy 
platforms reflects an understanding of the WHO as a politicized body. Under the 
technical understanding of the WHO, which dominated in 1948, such demands for 
public involvement were not taken into account.  
Like the Director-General, the regional directors, too, are quite independent of the 
WHA. Regional directors are not directly answerable to the Director-General or to the 
WHA (Godlee 1994a) and they enjoy wide-ranging discretionary power over their 
own budgets, staff, and projects. The regional office for the Americas, for example, is 
almost completely autonomous. This regional office, also called the Pan American 
Health Organization, pre-dates the WHO as an organization by several decades. One 
could imagine that the decentralized regional structure might offer flexibility and the 
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ability to respond to the specific needs of individual countries, especially in the 
developing world. But although the regional offices in theory brought the organization 
closer to the field, in reality the officers were embedded in national health bureaucra-
cies. Reflecting its original mandate to be a coordinating agency, the regional officers 
and country representatives were located in each country’s ministry of health, where 
they could consult on national health policies and disperse information through 
government agencies. Regional officers also tended to be political appointees with 
career aspirations within the bureaucracy. In light of a technocratic, consultative 
mandate, this setup might make sense, but given the expanded and more intervention-
ist course that Mahler set out, this structure was criticized as too tied to bureaucratic 
interests and too far from the lives being affected by health issues. 
Decentralization appears to have led to the abuse of power in the 1990s. The UN 
Joint Inspection Unit, an internal body that examines the functioning of the UN 
agencies concluded that “the decentralized structure of the World Health Organization 
is currently handicapped by many problems” and is not functioning as effectively in 
the 1990s as in earlier decades (Godlee, 1994c). There were allegations that some 
regional directors were using their discretion over jobs and resources to influence their 
own personal career aims rather than to improve the performance of their substantive 
projects. According to critics in the health field, the WHO put “too much power and 
too little accountability in the hands of a few people” (Godlee 1994c). Calls for reform 
suggested devolving more control to the country level where officers were on the 
ground floor of project implementation (UN Joint Inspection Unit, report no. 2,1993). 
These critiques reflect a growing interest in transforming the WHO from a consulta-
tive body into an executing body. 
The staffing of the organization also reflected its technical nature rather than the 
vision of health as a broader social, economic, and political issue. In the 1980s and 
1990s, the WHO was mostly staffed by medical doctors rather than by economists or 
anthropologists or sociologists. Neither Mahler nor Nakajima gave the organization a 
truly multisectorial staff, although its goals were moving in this direction. Experts 
from other fields were not involved in WHO activities. Moreover, although the WHO 
had long worked with the broader epistemic community of health professionals, these 
civil society groups were used as technical experts. The WHO would hire, for 
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example, scientific groups to monitor and study specific health concerns (Jacobson 
1973, 202). There was no real role for NGOs or civil society groups who were not 
directly medical professionals or scientists. The organization was also top heavy, with 
most of the fixed budget being spent on administrative costs rather than on country 
level projects. In sum, the WHO was narrowly focused on a small field of experts; it 
was not representative of the local communities that were suffering from health crises. 
Leadership Crisis 
The WHO’s mission became increasingly political as a result of the activism of 
Director-General Mahler. Mahler was described by the health community as a charis-
matic visionary, and “almost like a priest” by Dr. Miroslaw Wysocki, head of health 
information at the WHO’s South East Asia Regional Office (Godlee 1994b; Cueto 
2004). He was hailed as a hero by health activists, some of whom looked to Mahler as 
an idol. One colleague said “Ever since I studied public health I have realized that Dr. 
Mahler must have taken an incredible risk in proposing WHO and UNICEF to break 
away from the classical medical paradigm somewhere in the 1970s.”11 There has been 
almost no revisionism of this view despite broad acknowledgement that Mahler, 
through his charisma, created a new set of demands which the WHO as an organiza-
tion was ill-suited to meet. His idealism was not matched with the necessary practical 
tools. The same colleague who compared Mahler to a priest acknowledged that “health 
for all was an impossible concept” (Godlee 1994b). Mahler himself later said, “In 
Alma-Ata we came out with stars in our eyes.”12 Arguably, Mahler left the WHO just 
as the practical test of his vision was beginning. 
After his departure in 1988,13 Mahler was succeeded by Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima. As 
Director-General, Nakajima sought a return to the WHO’s technical mandate and he 
began to scale back the expanded political role of the organization. Nakajima’s style 
was more in keeping with the WHO Constitution, which states that the Director-
General “shall be the chief technical and administrative officer of the Organization” 
                                                 
11 Evelyne de Leeuw (1995) in a speech delivered during the Andrija Stampar Medical Awards 
Ceremony. 
12 Online interview available from Lifeonline at <http://www.tve.org/lifeonline/index.cfm? aid= 
1089>, accessed 23 Nov. 2008. 
13 According to the New York Times, everyone involved would have liked Mahler to stay but this 
did not happen as a result of “muddled” communication. 
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(Constitution, Ch. VII, Art. 31). But Mahler had raised the stakes, and the public 
discourse continued to argue that the WHO should be an active force for public good. 
Critics, mostly from the larger community of health experts and activists, measured 
the organization against its expanded mission and found it lacking. Under Nakajima 
the leadership, organization, and finances of the WHO came under increasing scrutiny 
and a public scandal began to unfold in which Nakajima—compared to the priest-like 
Mahler—became personally vilified. 
Nakajima did not pursue the more controversial topics opened up during Mahler’s 
tenure. Family planning was limited to a research program on contraception and 
infertility, tobacco control was not tackled, and he did not step up the drug programs, 
especially the AIDS drug program. When the WHA considered a resolution allowing 
the PLO to join the organization against the wishes of the US, Nakajima convinced 
them to back down. He began few new programs and did not develop the capacity of 
the organization to follow through on the old vision. He was committed to working 
through the existing government health ministries, which is how the WHO was 
structured to operate, and he did not pursue partnerships with NGOs or civil society 
outside of a technical nature. He returned, in essence, to a technical understanding of 
the WHO. Nakajima’s refusal to expand the WHO into areas of political debate was, 
in fact, in keeping with the traditional mandate and role of the organization. Support-
ers of Nakajima criticized Mahler’s vision for its “strong man style” that was too 
objective-driven, too outspoken, and too interventionist in the developing world 
(Godlee 1994a). But many in the medical community criticized Nakajima for lacking a 
coherent policy strategy and direction. As a report in the British Medical Journal saw 
it, his attempt to establish a new paradigm for health “floundered in a maze of incom-
prehension” (Godlee 1994a). 
As Director-General, both Nakajima and Mahler had large amounts of discretion-
ary power. While observers praised Mahler for using this autonomy to cast a new 
direction for the organization, they accused Nakajima of abusing his power. An exposé 
found that from 1988-1994 the number of highest paid employees at the WHO dou-
bled and some were being paid beyond the top level salary recommended by the UN 
Secretary General (Godlee 1994a). Although investment in staff might be defensible 
under a technocratic mandate, the impression was that his personnel decisions were 
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driven by patronage and not by policy. Eventually the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) was called in to arbitrate a number of labor disputes and it issued damaging 
findings against the WHO (reported in The Independent May, 6 1995). This led to a 
demoralized atmosphere among employees, making recruitment difficult and leading 
to the loss of its best people.  
The clash between the two visions struggling for dominance of the organization 
became most visible when Mann resigned his post as head of the AIDS program in 
1990. Mann resigned in protest of the lack of response from the UN and the WHO on 
AIDS issues. In the words of one colleague, “when Dr. Mahler was replaced by Dr. 
Hiroshi Nakajima, he had to deal with people who did not share his sense of urgency 
about the AIDS epidemic. For two years he endured increasingly onerous bureaucratic 
obstacles until, in 1990, he resigned in protest and frustration” (Leaning 1998, 754). 
Nakajima “actually limited Jonathan’s travel,” according to Dr. Joseph McCormick a 
health leader who worked with Mann on the first AIDS research team in Zaire, “There 
were instances when he wouldn’t let him go to a meeting, wouldn’t sign off on travel. 
Whether Jonathan should have stayed and weathered the storm or whether he made the 
right move—I think that’s an arguable point” (PBS interview). Mann’s global program 
on AIDS accounted for almost a third of the WHO budget and he had raised that 
money mostly through his own fundraising efforts (Dr. Jim Yong Kim, PBS inter-
view). Mann’s resignation had a devastating impact on the AIDS program and the 
remaining WHO leadership did little to fill the gap. Dr. Jim Yong Kim of the WHO 
reports that “We have a chart that shows the number of employees in HIV/AIDS in 
WHO since 1986 or so, and it was as high as 250 during the height of Jonathan 
Mann’s time here. Then it went down to four. And there was really very little activity 
going on here” (PBS interview). The loss was not just confined to the WHO; the larger 
AIDS research and activist community was also set back by the downsizing of the 
WHO’s focus on AIDS. Oddly though, the blame for this loss was leveled squarely at 
Nakajima and not at Mann. 
Western donors began to worry about the WHO’s loss of influence under Naka-
jima’s direction. In 1992 DANIDA, the Danish aid organization, was commissioned to 
investigate organizational weaknesses and to make recommendations. Members called 
for internal organizational changes, but Nakajima did not undertake major changes in 
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either of his two terms. In 1993, at the end of his first term, western donors took the 
unprecedented step of asking Japan to withdraw Nakajima’s candidature for re-
election. In January the New Scientist reported that the US and EC were against his 
nomination “because they believed Nakajima’s management style was damaging the 
credibility of the WHO and the morale of its staff at a time when challenges such as 
tackling AIDS and malaria demand inspired leadership” (Brown and Patel, 1993). In 
April 1993 an editorial commentary in the New Scientist argued that Nakajima’s 
leadership was harming the reputation of the WHO and its ability to carry out health 
work. It called for Nakajima to step down arguing that “The interests of the WHO 
would now best be served if the Japanese government persuaded Nakajima to with-
draw his candidacy.” 
Despite a bitter public battle, Nakajima was re-elected which led to allegations of 
threats and bribery (similar accusations were levied when Nakajima won the original 
nomination in 1988). It was widely rumored that Japan threatened third world board 
members with the withdrawal of aid if they did not vote for him and were promised 
contracts if they did. An external auditor from Britain’s National Audit Office was 
called on to investigate. The audit cleared Nakajima of corruption charges. It did, 
however, cite irregularities in the granting of contracts in the run up to the election. In 
the six months before the election, the contracts given out to members of the Execu-
tive Board doubled in number and tripled in value compared to the year before (1991). 
Twenty-three of the 31 Executive Board members received contracts. The audit did 
criticize Nakajima’s management style and made recommendations for reform 
(reported by Patel, 1993/Audit Report). The recommendations focused on a need to 
increase the organization’s transparency and accountability. 
The dominant narrative of the WHO crisis is one of failed leadership. Nakajima is 
largely blamed for having a bad personality, poor communication skills, and muddled 
vision. But this first-image analysis fails to take into account the growing demands on 
the WHO to become a political and not simply a technical organization. Nakajima’s 
biggest problem was that he resisted Mahler’s interventionist agenda, and this was 
unpopular given the new politics of health. Nakajima failed to realize that global 
health was already politicized and that a retreat to the technical mandate was no longer 
seen as legitimate. Neither Mahler nor Nakajima adapted the organization accordingly. 
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Financial Crisis 
Since its beginning in 1948, the WHO has relied on a combination of a regular budget 
provided by the UN membership and Extrabudgetary Funds (EBFs) provided by 
various types of donors. Since 1982 the WHO has had a policy of zero growth of its 
regular budget, forcing it to rely increasingly on EBFs. In 1990-1991, the expenditure 
of EBFs exceeded the regular budget for the first time. Eighty percent of the EBFs are 
donated by member countries (almost all of which are donated by the US, Europe, and 
Japan), almost 15 percent are donated by over 700 different private actors—primarily 
foundations and NGOs—and the rest, about six percent, are donated by other UN 
agencies.  
In 1994, Australia, Norway and the United Kingdom commissioned an interna-
tional research consultancy team (Vaughan, Mogedal, Kruse, Lee, Walt, and Wilde) to 
assess the WHO expenditures. The report was commissioned because financial report-
ing was considered an important element in keeping the institution accountable. There 
were also rumors among health activists that the WHO was spending up to 75 percent 
of its budget on salaries and office supplies. The report did indeed find that from 1982-
1993 an increasing proportion of funds was used on the global level as opposed to the 
country level, but not on the rumored scale (Vaughan et al. 1996, 233). In 1992-1993 
about 39 percent of the regular budget went to support organizational expenses. Eighty 
percent of the EBFs went to disease prevention. A comparison from 1984-85 to 1992-
93 shows “fairly consistent patterns for both funds with an increasing proportion of the 
regular budget being spent on organizational expenses (up 8% from 31% to 39%) and 
a decreasing amount for health and disease activities (down 6% from 35% to 29%)” 
(Vaughan et al. 1996, 240). The report concluded that in the years 1992-1993, “about 
US $50 million of regular budget funds were used to support the administration that 
might otherwise have been used directly for health related activities” (Vaughan et al. 
1996, 240). Most of the WHO’s budget goes to staff costs, followed by meetings and 
publications, which might be justified for a coordinating and information agency, but 
the report also found that spending on research was decreasing. “A disconcerting 
finding was the falling proportion of both the regular budget and EBFs being spent on 
supporting research activities. Regular budget funds for research have been dropping 
and are now less than 1% of the total, whereas about 20% of EBFs are still being 
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directed to research activities” (Vaughan et al. 1996, 233). If the goal is to eradicate 
health problems and to bring health to all, then these budget priorities seemed ques-
tionable. 
The report largely confirmed the growing suspicion among donors and the epis-
temic community that the WHO was not making the best use of its resources to tackle 
growing challenges. The concern was that the WHO was becoming a bloated agency 
which, as a result of low accountability and transparency, could get away with low 
levels of efficiency and low value-for-money spending. Donors wanted more effective 
management and accountability, and they attempted to create this by specifying how 
their funds could be used. The biggest EBF is the Voluntary Fund for Health Promo-
tion which contains twenty special accounts designated to special diseases or activi-
ties. Donors can contribute designated or undesignated funds, but by 1994 less than 
one percent were undesignated. Funds were designated to a high degree of specificity, 
as one manager explained, “Our AIDS money was to be allocated for HIV positive 
mothers in Lesotho” (quoted in Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 420-421). In response to 
this growing practice of earmarking, large programs that rely on EBFs have had to 
more clearly define their goals and create accountability and transparency mechanisms 
such as health indicators in their areas of work. “In this time of increased international 
competition for funds,” according to the report, these programs “have had to be 
increasingly entrepreneurial and to find efficiency savings … They have done this 
partly to convince their sponsors and donors that they are in fact a good investment” 
(Vaughan et al. 1996, 242). This is one of the first ways in which competition was 
introduced to the WHO—internal competition. WHO programs had to compete with 
one anther to attract the earmarked funds of donors, and they did this by increasing 
their transparency, accountability, and output. Larger programs were more successful 
in creating accounting standards and clearly defined objectives, and as a result they 
also won more earmarked funds from donors than smaller programs did (Vaughan et 
al. 1996, 243). 
In the face of low transparency and accountability, donors sought more leverage 
over the WHO. Many of the WHO’s special programs receive at least half of their 
budget from EBFs (Vaughan et al. 1996, 238). But this in turn has its own problems, 
as donor countries begin to gain undue influence over the WHO’s research and poli-
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cies. “Some of these programmes are now heavily dependent on a small number of 
external donors, which calls into question their longer term independence, stability, 
and sustainability. There appears to be an urgent need for WHO to rethink its regular 
budget contributions to these programmes” (Vaughan et al. 1996, 243). 
3.3 Competition and Institutional Change 
As with any other international institution, the WHO possesses two crucial 
resources—its authority and its funding. For most of its existence, the WHO was the 
leading authority among just a very few global health organizations. Up until the 
1980s, it received a regular budget and extrabudgetary funds which would increase 
annually. It lived in a sparsely populated institutional environment, was well-funded, 
and had a technical mandate that shielded it from political engagement and interven-
tionist activities. But by the end of the 1990s the WHO was suffering a crisis of 
legitimacy as a result of almost ten years of not managing the new expectation that it 
would be a leader on issues of health beyond technical matters. This legitimacy crisis 
had a direct negative impact on both the WHO’s authority and funding. 
Critics of the WHO did not try to gain access to it, as the conformist strategy 
would suggest, in order to change it from within. Instead, civil society actors were 
staying away from the increasingly irrelevant WHO. They did not want to be associ-
ated with the de-legitimized organization. Critics also did not engage in a protest 
movement. Civil society was not fired up and angered by the activism of the WHO, 
rather they were demoralized and frustrated with its inactivity. Even within the WHO, 
morale was low. There was, in a sense, nothing to protest. But critics did do two 
things: (1) they began turning to other organizations or creating new organizations to 
fill the gap left by the WHO; and (2) donors—both government and nongovernment—
began investing their funds elsewhere. The consequences of these moves included the 
loss of funding, the loss of expert personnel, and the growth of alternative venues for 
the pursuit of global health solutions. These consequences increased the competitive 
pressures on the WHO to the extent that institutional change was the only road to 
recovery. External pressures had the same effect on the organization writ large, as 
donor earmarking had within the organization on a smaller scale. If it wanted to 
continue to exist, the WHO needed to adapt; in particular, it needed to increase trans-
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parency, accountability, and representativity in order to regain the authority and 
funding it had lost. 
Competition from Other UN Agencies 
As mentioned earlier, competitive pressures were first introduced when WHO donors 
began earmarking their funds in an effort to better account for their use. This practice 
created competition among the programs within the WHO because each wanted to be 
the recipient of the designated funds. Competitive pressures were intensified, however, 
when donors began supporting similar health programs sponsored by agencies other 
than the WHO. International funding was insufficient to maintain the increasing 
number of organizations operating in health-related fields, and even potential coopera-
tion partners had to compete for resources. Each donor, having a budget for, say, 
childhood diseases, could decide whether to invest this budget in the WHO, the World 
Bank, UNICEF, or Save the Children. As the WHO suffered its crisis of legitimacy, it 
was handicapped in its ability to attract these funds. The WHO’s role in all areas of 
health was in decline. For example, the area of food safety and world hunger was 
taken over by the WTO and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (Lerer 
and Matzopoulos 2001, 432), children’s health was mainly being addressed by 
UNICEF. But two events in particular capture the pressures on the WHO’s authority 
and funding: the reinvention of the World Bank as a health agency and the creation of 
UNAIDS. 
The World Bank had neither the expertise nor the mandate to handle health issues, 
but over the course of the 1970s and 1980s it realized that development and economic 
growth were closely linked to health issues, especially to population growth. The Bank 
created a program on Health Nutrition and Population, but health sector support 
remained only a minor part of the its lending up until 1987 (Wogart 2003). In that year 
the Bank issued a report called Financing Health Services in Developing Countries—
An Agenda for Reform which stressed the need for targeted public health programs in 
developing countries. This report was followed in 1993 by another Bank report 
devoted to health, Investing in Health, whose goal was to set priorities for health 
spending and to sharpen the Bank’s strategic direction on health. The report used new 
research techniques to estimate the global burden of disease and to examine the cost-
effectiveness of health interventions. Among its recommendations was to “encourage 
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greater diversity and competition in the provision of health services by decentralizing 
government services, promoting competitive procurement practices, fostering greater 
involvement by nongovernmental and other private organizations, and regulating 
insurance markets” (Investing in Health 1993). 
The Bank’s focus on efficiency and its commitment to investing in health as part 
of a broader neo-liberal agenda for the promotion of growth made it an attractive 
alternative to the floundering WHO. By 1990 the World Bank was the largest source 
of (multilateral) world health financing (Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 427). Through 
the 1993 Investing in Health report, the World Bank spearheaded “major directions for 
health policy at the global level and in Africa” (Walt 1998, 140). It was playing an 
increasing technical and financial role in the health sector, and it had effectively 
“wrested initiative from the WHO on health matters” (Godlee 1994b). While the Bank 
initiated its activity in the health field out of its own concerns with development and 
poverty, potential donors saw in the Bank a more effective, goal-oriented, and finan-
cially accountable instrument for addressing global health. Donors who were growing 
skeptical of the WHO’s management of its health programs began redirecting their 
funds to the Bank. According to one analysis, “international funding was insufficient 
to maintain the increasing number of organizations operating in health-related fields, 
and cooperation soon turned to competition” (Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 427). 
While donors were getting impatient with the organizational structure and leadership 
of the WHO, health professionals in the epistemic community began worrying that the 
WHO was conceding its policy leadership to other agencies such as the World Bank 
(Walt 1998, 140).14 These concerns increased pressure for the WHO to reform. 
The second major blow to the authority of the WHO came on the issue of AIDS. 
Under the direction of Jonathan Mann, the WHO established one of the first global 
programs on AIDS in 1987. This program was widely recognized as a leader in 
researching AIDS and in championing prevention methods in the field. But after Mann 
left the WHO in 1990 as a result of a conflict of vision with Nakajima, the AIDS 
budget dropped off, the staff decreased radically, and the WHO leadership did little to 
build the program back up. Meanwhile, AIDS was growing dramatically in the number 
                                                 
14 It should also be noted that many, especially activists in the Third World, were concerned with 
the World Bank’s approach to health. Although more efficient, the Bank’s programs have also been 
heavily criticized. 
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of new infections, the number of deaths, and the number of countries affected. In 
1994, after years of floundering,15 members responded to the WHO’s lack of leader-
ship by closing down the Global Program on AIDS and in 1996 they removed the 
issue to a newly created agency, UNAIDS. UNAIDS was an innovative joint program 
that included a number of UN agencies, including the WHO. Although the WHO was 
still included, the move was widely seen as an expression of lack of confidence in the 
WHO. At one point the global program on AIDS within the WHO represented about a 
third of the WHO project budget. Now all funding and personnel resources were being 
managed by UNAIDS independently of the WHO. One UNAIDS program director at 
the time, Dr. Michael Merson, “acknowledged that many people in the United Nations 
felt that WHO’s technical base was too narrowly medical for it to deal effectively with 
AIDS prevention and control” (Godlee 1994b). Dr. Peter Piot, who headed the new 
agency, commented that “I felt that the top priority was exactly to put AIDS on the 
political agenda” (PBS interview). By retreating into its technical mandate, the WHO 
undermined its authority in what would become one of the most significant health 
challenges of the century. 
Competition from Civil Society Groups 
For most of the WHO’s existence, the number of health NGOs was low and constant. 
But if we take membership in ECOSOC as an indicator, the number of international 
health NGOs began to increase slowly in the late 1970s and then rapidly in the 1990s 
(figure 1). Certainly, this growth is a response to an increasing awareness of global 
health concerns and the growing discursive link being made between health, develop-
ment, and human rights. All UN agencies were struggling in the 1990s to come to 
terms with the increased number of NGOs who were beginning to demand participa-
tory rights. In 1990, for example, an NGO Working Group Position Paper urged the 
World Bank to be more supportive of equitable relationships with partners and more 
open decision-making. In 1991 the Bank began to review possibilities for civil society 
participation in policy processes. Similar NGO demands on the WHO are noticeably 
absent. A 1993 Harvard position paper on how civil society organizations can relate to 
                                                 
15 The total AIDS budget hardly changed in these six years according to the UNAIDS website. 
<http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/MakingTheMoneyWork/default.asp>, accessed 24 Nov. 
2008. 
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aid agencies “in ways that promote both democracy and health,” for example, failed to 
mention the WHO at all (Allison and Macinko 1993; Reich 1994). So while the 
number of health NGOs is increasing, in the 1990s they seem to have been working 
independently of the WHO. In any case, the growing number of civil society groups in 
the field of global health increased the number of potential authorities and increased 
the demand for limited resources from donors. As the WHO ignored calls to shift 
money and attention “to deal with concerns like resurgent tuberculosis, AIDS, mater-
nal and child health, growing resistance to standard antibiotics and the final eradica-
tion of polio” (Crossette 1997), NGOs and private foundations were getting into 
action. 
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Figure 1: Health-Related NGO Membership in ECOSOC. Source: ECOSOC. 
Some NGOs developed explicitly out of frustration with the WHO, thinking that they 
could do the same work better. A number of international health professionals, for 
example, created a movement for Essential National Health Research (ENHR). This 
movement grew out of frustration with the WHO and a belief that the organization 
could no longer help struggling developing countries meet their health goals. The 
movement believed that the only way to improve health in the developing world was 
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to gather better information on what the populations really needed. In 1990 the move-
ment issued a report that surveyed health research worldwide, identified strengths and 
weaknesses, and proposed improvements. In 1993 the group established the Council 
on Health Research for Development (COHRED). The goal of the organization is to 
promote health research and to bring this research into the policy planning processes 
of developing countries, without the bureaucracy and non-transparency of the WHO. 
In 1993 Science began a report on COHRED like this: “For years, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has had the field to itself as the premier international agency 
addressing the health concerns of developing nations. But now a potential rival has 
appeared” (Stone 1993). Interestingly, COHRED’s emphasis on providing technical 
expertise overlapped greatly with the WHO’s original mandate—even on this score 
the WHO’s authority did not go unchallenged. And although COHRED’s budget is 
much smaller than the WHO’s, one of its primary aims has been to raise money from 
Western donors in order to channel those funds more directly to the Third World.16 
Another development of the late 1990s was a role reversal for IGO interactions 
with civil society. Whereas partnerships usually meant that IGOs would cofinance 
NGO projects, with the advent of big private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, UN agencies became beneficiaries of private foundations in a major 
new way.17 By 2000 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation had become a leader in 
global health.18 The Foundation gives out approximately 800 million dollars a year 
through its global health initiative, which is almost the size of the WHO’s annual 
budget. In its first two years alone it spent more than twice the WHO’s annual budget 
on global health (Science 2002). Similarly, in 2001 the Global Fund to Fight Aids, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria was established out of dissatisfaction with the main UN 
health agencies’ lack of progress in dealing with these diseases. These foundations put 
the WHO under pressure in two ways. First, donations that would normally go directly 
                                                 
16 Another similar example which I do not discuss here is the Global Forum on Health. The Global 
Forum on Health was founded in the same period directly as a result of a commission’s finding that the 
WHO was not delivering the highest possible standards of health research. The WHO became a partner 
in the Global Forum, but the creation of a new organization to fulfill the mission of the WHO was 
another way of chipping away at the WHO’s authority. 
17 Private foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rotary International have long 
been involved in global health initiatives, but the activism and resources of the Gates Foundation have 
moved this interaction to a whole new level. 
18 Although the predecessor of this foundation was already making grants to the WHO in 1998. 
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to the WHO are often now diverted to one of these foundations first. Warren Buffet, 
for example, could in principle have donated money directly to the WHO, as Gates did 
before he created his foundation. When the WHO wants to receive money from the 
Gates Foundation or the Global Fund, it needs to apply. This means that the Gates 
Foundation and the Global Fund have a high degree of control over what projects the 
WHO pursues. Unlike its regular budget, which it can dispose of at its discretion, 
funds from foundations are usually awarded for specifically designated purposes. For 
example, the Gates Foundation awarded the WHO a grant over four years to “support 
an assessment of serological responses to vaccines in infants receiving Intermittent 
Preventive Treatment for Malaria.” Both foundations have developed a reputation for 
having a transparent donation method which emphasizes accountability and goal-
effectiveness. This means that the WHO is also under pressure to increase its transpar-
ency, accountability, and effectiveness if it wants to be eligible to compete for funds in 
the future. 
Second, the WHO has to compete for these private funds with any number of 
other civil society groups because these foundations are also granting money to health 
related NGOs. In fact, these foundations have gone far in leveling the playing field 
between smaller NGOs and organizations such as the WHO. Through this funding 
NGOs are enabled to implement health research and programs that would otherwise be 
the domain of the WHO. This allows for new authorities to develop. In 2007, for 
example, the Gates Foundation announced the funding of a new health research center 
at the University of Washington in Seattle. The institute’s purpose is to provide “high 
quality and timely information on health so that policy makers, researchers, donors, 
practitioners, local decision makers, and others can better allocate limited resources to 
achieve optimal results” (Moszynski 2007). The goal is to build a base of evidence so 
that health measures can be more closely guided by knowledge and data. The center’s 
mandate is almost identical to the one driving the founding of the WHO. Seemingly 
unaware that this had been the WHO’s mandate since 1948 the director, Dr. Christo-
pher Murray, announced that “This was an idea whose time had come” (Moszynski 
2007). The WHO Director-General responded wryly that “Strengthening global, 
regional, and country work on information and evidence is one of our priorities … I 
hope the newly announced institute will become an important partner in meeting these 
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goals.” Meanwhile, Murray’s focus is on the new institute: “We hope to set the gold 
standard for scientifically rigorous evaluation in health” (Moszynski 2007). Private 
foundations have put the WHO under competitive pressure by making it possible for 
new actors to enter the area of global health that it once dominated. 
Institutional Change 
By 1998, when Nakajima’s second term was nearing an end, it was evident to member 
countries, staff, and observers in civil society that institutional change was needed. 
Evoking the survival of the fittest metaphor one health journal article was titled, “The 
WHO: Change or Die.” With the title “Good Riddance” The Washington Post reported 
that Nakajima had finally agreed not to stand for re-election. He was replaced by Gro 
Harlem Brundtland who was chosen because she campaigned on the basis of promised 
reforms and as someone who had both the health background and the political back-
ground to carry out change. Brundtland was trained as a medical doctor, but she was 
also an experienced politician having become Prime Minister of Norway in 1981. She 
brought the WHO back into relevance in part by putting it back into political debates 
over health. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 1999, just 
months after taking office, she stressed that the WHO can promote health by having a 
“firmer grasp of the political agenda” (quoted in Birmingham 1999).  
According to a senior Brundtland adviser, “The challenge was to take WHO off 
the sidelines … It’s a balancing act between high-profile projects—we need to get 
back into the mainstream but need to get the headquarters into shape first” (quoted in 
Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 421). The message of change was made visible when 
Brundtland and her new management team moved into a building outside of WHO 
headquarters in order to create a reform strategy. The team focused on different 
organizational problem areas and for each problem area internal interviews were done 
and a timetable for change was developed. Brundtland and her senior management 
team, known as the Cabinet, restructured the entire organization around nine substan-
tive issues, or “clusters.”19 The many different large and small special programs were 
                                                 
19 The nine clusters, each headed by an executive director, are “social change and mental health,” 
“family and health services,” “sustainable development and healthy environments,” “communicable 
diseases,” “noncommunicable diseases,” “evidence and information policy,” “health technology and 
drugs,” “general management,” and “external affairs and governing bodies.” 
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now reduced and organized thematically into the nine clusters. During the transition 
about 750 employees changed office (Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 427). Within the 
first six months, the Turner and Rockefeller Foundations established a Global Health 
Leadership Fellows Program as a sign of support for Brundtland and as reward for 
changes. The program allowed Brundtland to bring new people into the organization, 
especially highly regarded professors and researchers. 
Brundtland worked especially hard to increase transparency and accountability. 
Resources were to be allocated on the basis of the new set of goals. There was also an 
explicit effort made to create implementation strategies and review mechanisms. 
Medium-term objectives were set for each cluster and leaders had to define measur-
able objectives. She also worked to reduce the WHO bureaucracy. Under Mahler and 
Nakajima the budgets were largely unspecified and there was no standardized report-
ing practice in place across the organization. Brundtland introduced the standard UN 
budget format and included a report on “deliverables” in order to enhance transpar-
ency and accountability. She also allocated regular budget funds away from Europe 
and to Africa, and she increased the proportion of funds going to the country level 
directly rather than the regional headquarters or Geneva (Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 
416). 
Brundtland also emphasized the need to work with partners in the UN and in civil 
society. In a speech at the opening of the WHA in 2000, her focus on “comparative 
advantage” indicates just how influenced she was by the competitive environment 
filled with new actors. 
What is our comparative advantage? Given our mandate and our human and financial 
resources, what are the functions that WHO is best placed to carry out more effectively 
than others? How can we shift the balance of our work to focus even more forcefully in 
areas where our comparative advantage really lies? And most importantly, how can we 
increase the impact of our contribution by engaging a variety of partners who can 
supplement and complement our contribution? 
The WHO could no longer afford to remain isolated from the global health activist 
movements and in order to stay viable it needed to reach out into other sectors beyond 
the narrow group of health professionals that dominated its staff under Nakajima. 
Brundtland invited the economist Jeffery Sachs to come to the WHO to help them 
Lora Anne Viola y WHO Says Competition Is Healthy 30
 
 
think about the relationship between health and development. She increased partner-
ships with the private sector, including drug manufacturers. By the end of her first six 
months in office, she had announced a major new partnership with pharmaceutical 
companies who agreed to support the WHO’s new Tobacco Free Initiative. The 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control was also a venue for the visible inclusion 
of NGOs who directly took part in the Framework negotiations. 
There was an explicit effort to clarify and articulate the WHO’s vision and values, 
and to define mission goals for each cluster and region. The WHO once again became 
part of new health initiatives and began repairing its authority on global health. In 
molding a new vision for the WHO, Brundtland chose to focus on two flagship pro-
jects—Roll Back Malaria and the Tobacco Free Initiative—soon after taking office. 
The projects were expected to “raise the profile of the organization internationally and 
act as catalysts for institutional reform within the WHO” (Lerer and Matzopoulos 
2001, 420). The idea was that these were projects where significant results could be 
achieved in a cost-effective way. In 2000 the WHO became a founding partner of 
GAVI, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, along with the World 
Bank and the Gates Foundation. GAVI was heralded as a significant new approach to 
vaccinations and immunizations. According to one report, an important event that 
made this new step possible came when “the WHO appointed a dynamic new director, 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, who was determined to make a major mark and to revitalize 
the organization” (Nature Immunology). The WHO plays a key role in GAVI, chairing 
the Executive Board of the Alliance (along with UNICEF) and providing technical and 
substantive guidance. “The year 2000 was seen as a ‘watershed year,’ the first time 
that people within the organization would see satisfied stakeholders and the rewards of 
the organization’s improved profile” (Lerer and Matzopoulos 2001, 422). 
Brundtland’s reforms certainly received their share of criticism and skepticism, 
with some claiming that she went too far and others not far enough (Brown 1999; 
Yamey 2002a; Yamey 2002b). The reality is that no amount of reform could transform 
the WHO once again into the sole leader on global health. Some developments, such 
as the increasing number of NGOs and the growing influence of private foundations, 
are bound to define the field of global health for decades to come. They are also likely 
to maintain the competitive pressure on organizations such as the WHO to stay trans-
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parent and to implement accountability mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
under Brundtland’s leadership the WHO went through major changes that helped to 
bring it back into the global health issue area as a contending force. The WHO may be 
overshadowed by the Gates Foundation and Global Fund, but at least it can be seen as 
a reputable partner and investment rather than as an irrelevant bureaucracy. 
Conclusion 
The example of the WHO’s trials and tribulations across the 1980s and 1990s illus-
trates the argument I developed at the beginning of this paper for how politicization, 
competition, and institutional change influence one another. I have attempted to show 
that competition can be the result of politicization and that competition, in turn, can 
result in institutional change. The increasing number of NGOs and private foundations 
acting as either advocates or executors of global public goods are putting UN institu-
tions under pressure to increase their transparency, accountability, and representativ-
ity. This is because donors with limited resources have a wide choice of investments in 
almost every issue area. They will be more attracted to those programs that have well-
defined goals, operate transparently, and can be held accountable for reaching their 
goals and for using their resources efficiently. 
There is, however, more to discover about how this process works. Competition 
cannot be expected to result automatically from politicization. The nature of competi-
tive pressures will likely vary with the nature of the organization and the number and 
capacities of real competitors in the environment. Not all civil society groups will have 
sufficient financial or authority resources to effectively challenge an IGO. Nor can we 
assume that competition is a necessary or sufficient condition for institutional change. 
IGOs have vested interests and sticky bureaucracies and regular budgets that come 
from UN member dues. These factors make change difficult and may allow even 
contested agencies to survive. Further study of politicization and institutional change 
will need to systematically address these factors. 
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